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Some International Comparisons
UNDERSTANDING of the structure of the national wealth of the United
States, of its growth, and of its relation to income would be considera-
bly deepened if we could compare our situation with that of other
countries, particularly countries similar to the United States in their
economic and institutional structure. Comparison of the present situa-
tion of foreign countries in different stages of their economic develop-
ment with that of the United States in earlier stages of its history
might be particularly interesting and suggestive. Unfortunately, ade-
quate comparisons of this type are not yet possible and cannot be
presented here. Limitations of time and resources have ruled out the
thorough exploration, examination, and adjustment of the data availa-
ble for foreign countries, necessary for an adequate international
comparison. Moreover, the relative scarcity of reliable and sufficiently
detailed estimates of national wealth for foreign countries and the
disparity in the methods of estimation used would make such com-
parisons both difficult and precarious. We must therefore be satisfied
with a much less ambitious approach.
All that is attempted in this chapter is the comparison of a few basic
structural characteristics of national wealth for varying groups of
countries—sometimes less than ten, sometimes as many as forty—during
the 1950's. Even this limited comparison has been made possible only
by the recent publication in Income and Wealth Series VIII of national
wealth estimates for a number of countries for which they were not
previously available, and by the inclusion in the introduction to that
volume of a set of comparative tables based on these country papers.1
Any attempt to go beyond the countries and dates covered in Income
and Wealth Series VIII does not in the present situation promise an
increase in information commensurate with the effort required, except
in the analysis of marginal capital-output ratios, omitted from this
report.
The comparisons center on three basic aspects of national wealth:
1TheMeasurement of National Wealth, "Introduction," by Raymond W. Gold-
smith and Christopher Saunders; 'Statistics of National Wealth for Eighteen. Coun-
tries," by Th. van der Weide (Income and Wealth Series VIII, London, Bowes and
Bowes, 1959).
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1. The structure of net national wealth in current prices, i.e., the
distribution of total national wealth among the main types of
tangible assets
2. The distribution of net national wealth among the three main
economic groups—business enterprises, households, and govern-
ment
Theratio of net to gross reproducible tangible wealth
Structure of National Wealth
THESHAREOF LAND
For broad international and historical comparisons one of the two or
three crucial ratios characterizing the structure of national wealth, and
possibly the one most revealing of a country's economic status, is the
proportion of land (particularly agricultural land) to total national
wealth.
This share now stands at about 17 per cent in the United States, after
having declined fairly steadily from 25 per cent in 1929, 35 per cent
in igoo, and 45 per cent in the middle of the nineteenth century.2 The
shares are remarkably similar for most European countries for which
the figures are available, as shown in Table 22. They are slightly below
the United States level for Belgium and the Netherlands, and slightly
above it for West Germany and Luxemburg, lying for all countries
between one-seventh and one-fifth of the value of total tangible wealth.
For Sweden, the ratio is substantially below that of the United States,
about one-eighth. It probably would still be somewhat lower for the
United Kingdom, for which no current estimate is available. Unfortu-
nately, only one underdeveloped and primarily agricultural country,
India,is included in the comparative tabulations of Income and
Wealth, Series VIII. Here the land—tangible assets ratio is, of course,
much higher and amounts to close to 50 per cent, indicating an approxi-
mate equality between the value of land and of reproducible tangible
assets. Ratios of this magnitude will probably be found in many of the
predominantly agricultural countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, Central America, and Africa.3 Such ratios are not at all surprising
2 The estimates for the United States are taken (unless otherwise indicated) for
the period since 1900, from the appendix tables to this report, and for the nineteenth
century, from R. W. Goldsmith "The Growth of Reproducible Wealth of the
United States of America from to [950," Income and Wealth Series II, London,
1951.
3 For Honduras, an estimate not utilized in Table 22(E. Tosco, La Riqueza de
Honduras, mimeographed, September 1957) puts the share at 44 per cent.
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TABLE 22
OF LAND IN NATIONAL WEALTH, SELECTED CouNTRIEs AND YEARS, 1950-56
Land as
Land as Per Cent of Tangible
Per Cent of All Assets Excluding





1.United States 1955 17 5 18 6
2.Sweden 1952 11 2 12 2
3.Belgium 1950 14 16
4.Netherlands 1952 15 12 18 15
5.Australia 1956 17 9 18 10
6.West Germany 1955 20 22
7.France 1954 14 15
8.Yugoslavia 1953 26 23 29 25
9.Norway 1953 2
10.Luxemburg 1950 20 10
11.South Africa 1955 28
12.India 1950 51 45
SOURCE: Van der Weide, op.cit., Table I.
if it is recalled that we need look back only about a century to find in
the United States equally high shares of land in total tangible wealth.
Yugoslavia and South Africa, two countries ranking in their economic
development between the industrial countries of Europe and North
America and the agrarian countries of the tropics and subtropics, show
land-wealth ratios of aboutper cent.
The ratio of agricultural land to total wealth in the United States
of 6 per cent, a ratio which is more characteristic of economic develop-
ment than the all-land ratio since the latter includes urban land of
high locational value, is among the lowest in the world. It is, however,
above that for some Scandinavian countries and probably for Great
Britain, and compares with ratios of approximately 15 per cent in
France and the Netherlands, 25 per cent in Yugoslavia, and45 per
cent in India.
The ratio of all land to total national wealth thus combines two
main components. The first is the ratio of agricultural land to na-
tional wealth shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 22. This ratio is
likely to decline in the course of economic development, as agriculture
gradually accounts for a declining share of labor force and output. The
second component isthe ratio of nonagricultural (mainly urban)
land to national wealth. It is not evident that this ratio will have a
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definite long-term trend. In some phases of economic development,
particularly during rapid urbanization, the ratio may rise. During
others it may fall, particularly when improvements in transportation
reduce the scarcity value of land in urban centers. It is, however, to be
expected that the second component of the land—national wealth ratio,
reflecting locational advantages, will increase in importance in com-
parison with the first component, which is largely the result of differ-
ences in physical characteristics such as soil fertility, though locational
factors also play an important role in it.
THE EQUIPMENT-STRUCTURES RATIO
A second important ratio is the relation of the value of equipment
(producer and consumer durables) to structures shown in Table 23.
TABLE 23
RATIO OF EQUIPMENT TO STRUCTURES, SELECTED COUNTRIES AND YEARS, 1950-55
(per cent)
Ratio of Total Ratio of Enterprise
Equipment to Structures,Equipment to Structures,
Consumer Durables Dwellings




1.United States 1955 50 29 35 85
2.Belgium 1950 75 47 54 265
3.Luxemburg 1952 69 81 165
4.Netherlands 1952 88 42 58 124
5.West Germany 1955 70 42 47 105
6.Norway 1953 38 46 88
7.Yugoslavia 1953 58 37 38 71
8.Canada 1955 71 39 49 95
9.Union of South Africa1955 34 36a 53a
10.Colombia 1953 29 33 47
11.Japan 1955 81 38 43 72
12.India 1950 25 27 57
SOURCE: Van cler Weide, loc.cit.
a Excluding government corporations and public enterprises.
While this ratio now stands at about 50 per cent in the United States,
it is substantially higher for each of the few countries for which the
information is available: about 70 per cent for Canada and West Ger-
many; 75 per cent for Belgium; fully 8o per cent for Japan; and almost
90 per cent for the Netherlands. If consumer durables are excluded, in
all but two of the eleven countries the ratio of producer durables to
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all structures is higher than in the U.S. The median ratio for these
eleven countries of slightly less than 40 per cent compares with an
American ratio of slightly less than 30 per cent.
For purposes of analysis, it is probably preferable to limit the com-
parison to business and government enterprises, excluding dwellings
as well as consumer durables. The picture then is somewhat different.
The United States with a ratio of producer durables to enterprise
structures of 85 per cent is close to the median for the eleven foreign
countries for which the information is available. The ratio is con-
siderably higher than in the U.S. in all Western European countries
for which it can be calculated—Belgium, Luxemburg, the Nether-
lands, and West Germany—and slightly higher in Canada and Norway.
It is lower only in definitely underdeveloped countries—in descending
order, Japan, Yugoslavia, India, Union of South Africa, and Colombia.
It is not easy to explain these relationships, particularly in view of
the well-known status of the U.S. as a highly mechanized country with
an ample stock of consumer durables. In only a few countries, par-
ticularly in Japan and to a lesser extent in West Germany, does the
relatively small value of the stock of dwellings explain the high ratio of
equipment to structures. Relative costs-_particularly the relatively high
cost of building construction in the U.S.—may provide part of the
answer. Incompatibilities in coverage and completion as well as differ-
ences in length of life probably are all responsible for some of the
difference. Much more data and analysis, as well as a detailed examina-
tion of the derivation of the estimates underlying Table 23, however,
are needed before a satisfactory explanation can be attempted.
THE SHARE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
There is at least one point at which the structure of the national wealth
of the United States differs from that of many, if not most, forergn
countries—the share of both foreign assets and foreign liabilities in
total national wealth. This statement unfortunately cannot be docu-
mented in detail, since only a few foreign countries have sufficiently
accurate or continuous estimates of their foreign assets and liabilities
for comparison with those of their domestic wealth.
In the United States, foreign assets represented only 5 per cent of
domestic tangible wealth including monetary metals, and not more
than 3.5 per cent excluding them, even at the end of the first postwar
decade (1956).Foreignliabilities (including all foreign investments
in the U.S.) amounted to over 2 per cent of domestic tangible wealth,
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leaving a net balance ofper cent including monetary metals and of
not much over 1percent excluding them. These ratios are apparently
considerably below those that can be inferred for many foreign coun-
tries, both developed European and underdeveloped non-European
countries. In Belgium and the Netherlands, for instance, the net for-
eign balance constitutes io and 7percent, respectively, of national
wealth.
In the countries which in the past have been heavy importers
of foreign capital, the net foreign balance is usually negative, since
foreign liabilities, in the form of both borrowing abroad and foreign
ownership of domestic assets, are larger than those countries' foreign
assets, including their holdings of monetary metals. In Canada, for
instance, the net foreign balance is equal to about 12 per cent of
national wealth; in Latin America (as a whole) somewhat less than io
per cent; in Australia 5 per cent (the result of foreign assets of 2 per
cent and foreign liabilities of 7 per cent of national wealth); and in
Norway to 1.5 per cent.4 There is little doubt that net foreign liabilities
are in similar or even larger proportions of national wealth for a num-
ber of underdeveloped countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, although exact statistical calculations are not feasible, chiefly
because of the lack of estimates of national wealth.
OWNERSHIP OF TANGIBLE ASSETS
The distritution of reproducible tangible assets among business enter-
prises, households, and governments—which, of course, is not identical
with the share of these three groups in national equity—shows con-
siderable international differences. In the United States in 1955nearly
one-half of tangible assets were operated by business enterprises(if
farms are included); two-fifths represented dwellings and consumer
durables operated by households; and a little over one-eighth were
operated by the government. These ratios would not be substantially
changed by the inclusion of nonreproducible assets, particularly land.
Of the countries for which the necessary data are available (Table
24) two—Belgium and Canada—show a share of the government in
reproducible tangible wealth only slightly higher than the ratio found
in the United States. A few other countries show a markedly higher
ratio, averaging one-fifth of total reproducible tangible wealth—the
Netherlands, West Germany (partly estimated), and Japan. Of the
4 Most of these ratios are derived from information in the country papers in




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































countries for which the ratio can be calculated—all basically free-enter-
prise countries—the share of the government is highest in France,
where the available estimates put it at approximately two-fifths. Almost
as high a ratio would probably be obtained for Australia.
The share of households in the ownership of tangible wealth in the
Netherlands and West Germany is similar to the American level of
two-fifths. It is somewhat lower—in the order of one-third—in Australia
and Japan; chiefly because of the relatively low share of dwellings in
national wealth. On the other hand, the ratio is substantially above
the American level in Belgium because of the high proportion of
dwellings in the estimates of national wealth.
The share of private business enterprises(including farms but
excluding government owned enterprises) is not very different from the
American ratio of somewhat below one-half in most of the other
countries for which estimates are available.
Ratio of Net to Gross Wealth
The ratio of the net to the gross value of reproducible tangible assets—
the significant ratio, since there is no difference between the two
components for inventories and for land—is astonishingly similar for
the few countries for which estimates are available, as Table 25 shows.
The four foreign countries for which the ratio can be calculated—
West Germany, Netherlands, Yugoslavia, and Australia—all show a
ratio of net to gross reproducible tangible wealth of very close to
6o per cent which is the figure obtained for the United States.5 The
ratios are also very similar for most of the main components of
reproducible tangible assets such as dwellings and producer durables.
Substantial differences appear only in the ratios of nonresidential pri-
vate structures, government structures, and consumer durables, but
they are not systematic. For private nonresidential structures as well
as consumer durables, the net-gross ratio for the United States is low
5 Such a ratio can be the result of numerous combinations of rates of growth of
expenditures and their average length of life. It may, for instance, represent the
combination of a 2percent growth and a life of slightly more than 6o years, an
unlikely high value for the average of all capital expenditures; of a growth ofper
cent and a life of slightly more than 40 years; of a growth of 4 per cent and a life
of a little over 30 years; or, again a less likely combination, of 5 per cent growth
and 25 years' life. Hence, several countries may show the same net-gross ratio
although capital expenditures have increased at considerably different rates in the
past, provided only that there are offsetting differences either in the distribution of
capital expenditures among items of differing durability or because similar items
are retained in the stock for longer or shorter periods.
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TABLE 25
RATIO OF NET TO GROSS REPRODUCIBLE TANGIBLE WEALTh,




(1956) (1955) (1952) (1953) (1956)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1.Reproducible tangible wealth,
including item 9 60 60 61 59
2.Reproducible tangible wealth,
excluding item 9 62 59 61 62 61
3.Structures, private 58 57 61 58 56
4.Structures, dwelling 56 60 61 51 57
5.Structures, other private 53 55 61 66 53
6.Structures, government 59 50 50a 57a 57a
7.Equipment, private,
including item 9 55 61 59 53
8.Equipment, private,
excluding item 9 60 58 57 56 56
9.Consumer durables 50 67 61 49
Col. 1, Tables A-5 and A-7.
Cols. 2 to 5, Van der Weide, op.cit., Table II.
a Includes government equipment.
compared with most of the other countries for which data are available,
while it is high for government structures.
In view of our limited information about the foreign data's relia-
bility and scope, and of the many factors that could be responsible for
differences in the net-gross ratio for individual types of assets, no at-
tempt to explain each of these differences will be made. It is more
remarkable that, notwithstanding the differences of five countries'
structure of reproducible tangible assets, length of life of the different
types of assets, and time shape of the capital expenditure streams which
underlie the ratio, the over-all ratio of net to gross reproducible tangi-
ble wealth is practically identical. This near identity, of course, may
be, and probably is, at least in part, the result of offsetting differences
in the various factors that determine the national over-all ratio.
Rate of Growth of National Wealth in the Postwar Period
The number of countries for which the rates of growth of real nationa]
wealth during the postwar period can be calculated is so small that not
much can be concluded from a comparison of the figures shown inSOME INTERNATiONAL COMPARISONS
Table 26 and Chart io, with the rate of growth of national wealth in
the United States.6 It is fairly evident, however, that unless the foreign
countries for which the data are available are entirely untypical of the
world outside, the rate of growth of real reproducible wealth per head,
during the postwar decade and after, was at least as rapid abroad as in
the United States. In Europe and the (former) British Dominions, the
stock of tangible wealth apparently has grown faster than in the U.S.,
a relation partly explained by the rapid reconstruction in a number of
European countries. The rate of growth in the underdeveloped coun-
tries, about which unfortunately littleis known outside of Latin
America, seems to have been, at best, as rapid and generally somewhat
slower than in the U.S.
TABLE 26
RATES OF GROWTH OF REAL NATIONAL WEALTH IN POSTWAR PERIOD,
SELECTED COUNTRIES AND PERIoDs, 1945.58
cent per year)
AGGREGATE REPRODUCIBLE REPRODUCIBLE WEALTH
WEALTH PER READ
Consumer Durables Consumer Durables






1.United States 1945-58 8.9 .3.4 1.7 2.2 1.7
2.Argentina 1945-55 2.9 2.2 0.7
3.Colombia 1945-53 3.6 2.2 1.4
4.Australia 1947-56 4.6 4.6 2.4 2.2
5.United Kingdom 1947-57 3.4 0.4 3.0
6.South Africa 1945-55 5.2 2.0
7.Canada 1947-55 ..6.8 6.2 2.9 3.9
8.West Germanya 1948-55 5.4 1.9 3.5
9.Norway 1945-55 5.6 1.0 4.6
Country papers in Income and Wealth Series viii, except for United States (Table A-2)
and for United Kingdom (National Income and Expenditures, U.S. Department of Commerce,
various issues).
a Only fixed reproducible assets.
The calculation of rates of growth of reproducible national wealth
by means of the comparison of estimates of (deflated) wealth at two
points of time, or of the comparison of a period's cumulated net
capital expenditures with the stock of capital at the beginning of the
period, is limited by scarcity of data for the nine countries listed in
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Source: Underlying data in Table 26.
the rates of growth of reproducible tangible wealth in the postwar
period for another half-dozen countries for which bench-mark estimates
of national wealth in the postwar period are available. One of two
approaches must be accepted for reducing the available estimates of
gross capital expenditures(in prices that underlie the bench-mark
estimates of national wealth) for the postwar period to a net basis.
One is using the ratio of depreciation allowances to gross capital
expenditures derived from the countries' official national accounting
statements; the other is by applying a standard ratio, based on the
theoretical relationship between gross and net capital expenditures,
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that corresponds to a given rate of growth of capital expenditures in
the past and an assumed. length of life of reproducible tangible assets.7
Most of the countries for which additional rough estimates thus
become available show a rate of growth per head of reproducible
tangible wealth (excluding consumer durables) during the postwar
period—usually between and 1957—which is definitely above the
rate of 1.75percent observed for the United States. This is undoubtedly
so for Japan, with a rate of growth of real reproducible assets per head
of at least 4 per cent, and for Belgium, with the rate of aboutper
cent. For France, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and India, the rate of
growth seems to have been at about the same level as for the United
States. Only in Sweden does the growth of real reproducible tangible
assets per head seem to have been definitely below the U.S. level.
The inclusion of these additional countries, notwithstanding the
lesser reliability of the estimates that can be derived for them, thus
seems to reinforce the conclusion drawn from Table 26,thatthe rate
of growth of reproducible wealth in the United States during the
entire postwar period, and still more during the 1950's, was at best
as rapid as in the rest of the non-Communist world and may well have
proceeded at a slightly slower rate than in those countries. The com-
parable rates in Communist countries were probably in most cases well
above the U.S. level, although the absence of published bench-mark
estimates of the stock of reproducible tangible assets makes documenta-
tion diflicult.8
This relationship—the absence of a lead in the American rate of
growth—probably is in contrast to the experience in the prewar period,
but it is in line with the fact that real income per head also increased
more rapidly in many foreign countries during the postwar period
(again excluding Southeast Asia) than in the United States. However,
the position of foreign countries compared with the U.S. appears to
have been more favorable with respect to the rate of growth of repro-
ducible tangible wealth than with respect to income, with the result
that1 insofar as a judgment is possible, the capital-output ratio rose
more (or fell less) in the rest of the world than in the U.S.
7Cf.Chapter 3.
8Withthe gross investment rates of between 20and30percent encountered in
most Communist countries, the high net-gross capital expenditure ratios, and the
rapid rate of growth, in real per head terms, of the volume of national product
and capital expenditures, the stock of capital is bound to increase by much more
than 2percent a year, even if the average reproducible capital-output ratio at the
beginning of the postwar period had been very high in international comparison_
which is unlikely.
104SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARiSONS
Changes in the Structure of Wealth During the Postwar Period
There is not enough statistical material available for foreign countries
to permit a statistically founded comparison between the changes in
the structure of national wealth that have taken place in the United
States during the postwar period with those that have occurred abroad.
The figures at hand for a few countries (Germany, Canada, Aus-
tralia) and fragmentary material for a few others make it likely,
however, that the changes were in the same direction abroad as those
observed in the United States after World War II. Thus, the share of
reproducible tangible assets appears to have continued its increase at
the expense of the share of land. Within reproducible tangible assets,
the share of equipment has increased substantially. While it advanced
in the postwar decade from 13to19percent in the U.S., it rose during
approximately the same period from 24 toper cent in Germany,
from 23 to 29 per cent in Canada, and from 17toi8 per cent in
Australia. Similar changes appear to have taken place also in a number
of underdeveloped countries, where they accompanied the increase in
the share of manufacturing in national output, but figures are missing
to document statistically the shift in the structure of national wealth.
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